References
Whilst FPV drones have been proven as a highly effective precision strike loiter munition, they are vulnerable to jamming, interference, and all of the difficulties that long range radio frequency (RF) links bring. Russia began using fibre-optic drones in Ukraine in the spring of 2024 and they have proven resistant to some of these issues, such as jamming and the negative effects of terrain[1][15].
The use of RF jammers is common in the conflict, with jammers being seem as standalone deployments as well as frequently fitted to vehicles[1]. Whilst these jammers are imperfect (for example they must be operating in the same frequency space as the drone to be effective), they do offer a small bubble of protection against these weapons. Additionally, handheld drone detection devices are available to warn soldiers of drones in the area[3]. However, the use of fibre-optic drones bypasses both of these protections[6].
Fibre-optics is not the only way to counter issues such as RF jamming though, with some drones being fitted with terminal-stage AI control. This means that during the last moments of a drones flight if the control line is jammed or otherwise lost, the drone can continue on to strike a target effectively[4]. This can be through several mechanisms, such as using AI to remain locked on to the last target selected by the operator, or using AI to select and prioritise available targets in view of the video feed.
That said, the use of fibre-optics for control of munitions is nothing new, with weapons such as the TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) missile offering ranges in the region of 2.4 miles and has been in service since the 1970s. The use in Ukraine is not even the first use of fibre-optics for drones. Back in the 2000s, the United States aimed to develop "a hand-held, tube-launched, fiber-optic guided, loitering munition suitable for non-line-of-sight target prosecution by individual warfighters in urban environments[10]." Although this was never fielded, the fiber-optic requirement was later dropped and much of the developed technology was used for the Switchblade 300 loitering munition[11].
As for range, one of the earliest captured Russian fibre-optic drones was labelled as carrying just short of 11km of fibre[1]. By late 2025, this had extended to 50km of range, as available on the Ukrainian "Ptashka" drone[6]. The use of fibre-optics has not been limited to FPV quadcopters either, with Russian fixed-wing Molniya also being spotted using fibre-optics[7]. Additionally, they have been used on unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) too[13].
The increased range alone is not the only benefit though, as the fibre-optic link allows the drone to fly places that a RF-based drone simply could not, such as through trench lines, into underground bunkers, or through buildings. RF-based video transmission can struggle to penetrate through reinforced concrete[13] and are further degraded in urban environments by multipath interference, where signals reflect off surrounding structures and arrive via multiple paths, reducing link reliability[14]. Additionally, the fibre allows for high-speed, low-latency data transmission which can enable higher quality video feeds to assist with more effective navigation and target selection[13].
The fibre-optic can be used to transmit all aspects of the data required from the drone, including control, telemetry, and video links[13]. This ensures that nothing is transmitted over RF and therefore making the drone harder to detect[6].
Another reported advantage is that the control link from the remote pilots controller is not transmitting RF making, which reportedly makes detecting the pilots location more difficult. This has previously been achieved by placing antennas away from the launch site and connecting to the antennas over long cables. However, the use of fibre-optics prevents the pilot-side transmissions being transmitted over RF also, further protecting the pilots themselves[1]. However, some operators counter that ISR drones (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) can spot the fibre from the air (especially if multiple drones are launched from the same spot) and trace the fibre to the launch point[9].
Fibre-optic drones are also more effective that RF-based drones at being so called Ждун (Zhdun) drones. This is one name for a technique where drones are deployed to an area, land, and wait for targets such as vehicles to pass along a road. They are more effective as RF drones may lose their connection due to terrain when very low to the ground, additionally their transmissions may be detected revealing their presence[9].
Whilst the use of fibre-optics brings certain benefits, it also introduces certain drawbacks. For example, it adds additional weight to the drone which can reduce flight time and payload capacity[7]. It also requires the operator to be careful regarding their flight path to ensure that the fibre does not break during flight. Such as avoiding driving over roads where vehicles may break the fibre[8].
The potential for the fibre to break is a key vulnerability of this type of drone. Therefore, the fibre spool itself is attached to the drone, rather than being on the ground[13]. This offers the major benefit of ensuring that terrain and navigating through obstacles such as foliage do not cause the fibre to get caught up and therefore snap. However, another disadvantage of this is that as the fibre pays out the weight distribution of the drone, and therefore its flight characteristics, can change[8]. Ensuring the fibre does not break during flight requires a different flying methodology for remote pilots.
In addition to these issues, there is also concerns around supply chain. With some remote pilots reporting that some Chinese supplied spools break half-way through the flight. Something that operators put down to potential supply-chain sabotage[8]. However, it could be explained simply though low quality products being supplied.
There are of course methods of dealing with fibre-optic drones, such as anti-drone nets, kinetic interceptors, small arms fire, and interestingly: rotating barbed wire[12], which is designed to entangle and ultimately break the fibre left behind as the drone flies.
Whilst fibre-optic drones offer significant benefits they have not entirely replaced RF-based drones. One reason for this is whilst jammers can prevent the use of RF-drones, an initial wave of fibre-optic drones can be used to destroy or disable jammers before additional radio frequency drones are deployed during an attack[9]. Additionally, fibre-optic drones are heavier, more complex, and more costly - in some cases costing more double their RF equivalents[9].
In April 2026, the Doves of Freedom reported that the cost per kilometer of the type of fibre used by strike drones had risen significantly over the previous year[18]. They also note that ironically, Ukraine destroying Russia's only fibre-optic factory in 2025 has exacerbated the issue, meaning that both nations must compete over the same supply of chinese manufactured fibre[18]. Vyriy, a Ukrainian drone manufacturer, stated that the price-per-kilometer of fibre had risen in one quarter from $4 to $29[19] - and it seems these prices are continuing to increase[18].
The drones being heavier exacerbates the issue of battery-life and payload capacity. The longer the spool, the heavier it is, but with a 20km spool weighing approximately 2.5kg[18], this will reduce the available payload capacity of the system.
Furthermore, just as not all radio frequency based video transmission systems are compatible, not all ground stations and air units are compatible. This further complicates logistics and the sharing of resources across units - as it's entirely possible for a unit to receive a batch of fibre drones for which they do not have a compatible ground station, and therefore they cannot use them[18][20]. With some reports saying that units require as many as five different ground stations to ensure compatibility with their drones. Although calls are being made to address this issue and standardise the hardware available to drone units[20].
In mid-2025, Oleksiy Zhulinskiy - the CEO of Ukrainian fibre-optic drone manufacturer 3DTech, reported that only approximately 10% of Ukrainian drones were fibre-optic[8]. Whereas in mid-2025, the Wall Street Journal reported the number as "five to ten percent"[16] and in January 2026 Mezha.ua reported it as "not more than 15 percent[17]".
In summary, fibre-optic drones have not replaced RF-based drones and there is no evidence that they will for the short-term. Additionally, they are not the only option to handle issues such as signal jamming as the use of AI for terminal targeting has been shown to be effective too. They are simply another tool available to overcome specific issues on the ground and bring with them their own benefits and drawbacks.
That said, AI terminal guidance is not mutually-exclusive with fibre-optic control and therefore this could also be added to a fibre-optic drone too, to further enhance effectiveness, particularly in the event of link disruption during the final stages of a strike.